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SHOULD HEALTH SERVICE PROVIDERS BE
STRICTLY LIABLE FOR PRODUCT-
RELATED INJURIES? A LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
by
David Crump * and Larry A. Maxwell**
URING the course of a hospital stay, a patient encounters a vast
array of products. These products may be used in conjunction
with diagnostic tests, surgical procedures, continuing medical
treatment, or routine boarding needs. A survey of these products would
include highly specialized apparatus such as computer-assisted tomogra-
phy (CAT) scanners, X-ray mammographers, and hemolytic dialysis units,
as well as simpler devices such as wheelchairs, beds, and gowns. Consum-
able goods would range from exotic chemotherapy drugs, butterfly valves,
and gut sutures to more common items such as aspirin, bandages, and
meals.
May a health care provider be held liable without fault when one of
these products fails and is associated with a medical accident that causes
injury to a patient? Plaintiffs' lawyers in medical malpractice cases have
campaigned vigorously for such a result. The traditional and virtually
unanimous holding of the courts has been that physicians or hospitals are
not strictly liable for the effects of products used incidentally in the provi-
sion of their services, although manufacturers may be.' These courts have
reasoned that medical professionals are service providers, not sellers of
products. But two recent decisions of intermediate appellate courts have
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held that hospitals are indeed sellers of the products they incidentally use
and may be held liable without fault for health care accidents under theo-
ries of implied warranty of fitness and strict tort liability. These decisions,
rendered by Texas courts of civil appeals in Providence Hospital v. Truly2
and Thomas v. St. Joseph Hospital,3 are of national significance They
represent a fundamental departure from well-established previous hold-
ings in jurisdictions throughout the country.-
This Article summarizes the factual settings and holdings of Truly and
Thomas. It next discusses the body of law governing the application of
implied warranty and strict liability to health care providers prior to these
two decisions. Thereafter, it compares the reasoning in Truly and Thomas
with economic policy rationales for strict liability. The potential for imple-
menting these economic purposes in view of Truly and Thomas and the
possible consequences for the medical profession and the public are the
focus of this latter section of the Article. A final section summarizes the
authors' conclusions.
I. THE TRULY AND THOMAS DECISIONS
In Providence Hospital v. Truly the jury found that a drug called Mi-
ochol, used in an operation performed at defendant hospital upon plain-
tiffs eye, was unfit and had caused personal injuries to her.6 However, the
jury absolved defendant hospital of fault, holding that it was innocent of
any negligence. 7 The unfitness finding was based upon evidence from
which the jury apparently concluded that the drug, although initially de-
fect-free, became adulterated during the procedure.8 The drug was admin-
istered entirely in the course of medical services rendered to plaintiff.
When plaintiff was discharged, the defendant hospital presented her with a
bill containing an item construed by the appellate court as a recovery of
the hospital's expense for the cost of the drug.9 The jury fixed the amount
2. 611 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, writ dism'd).
3. 618 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
4. An idea of their significance can be grasped by comparing the decisions to the reac-
tion when strict liability for blood transfusions was imposed by a maverick Illinois decision.
One commentator describes that reaction as one of shock throughout the medical world and
states that it "opened the floodgates, but not to litigation." In fact, the result was nationwide
statutory repeal. See infra note 46 and authorities cited therein. The Truly and Thomas
decisions are of greater potential impact than the Illinois blood transfusion decision, since
they apply to a broader range of products. Truly is potentially applicable in every state that
has adopted the UCC and would create strict liability for every incidentally used product
except those, such as blood, that are the subjects of express statutory exemption. 611 S.W.2d
at 133. Thomas would create strict liability for every product not "essential" to the health
service transaction, a test so ambiguous that its scope is difficult to assess. 618 S.W.2d at 796.
5. See infra notes 41 & 42.
6. 611 S.W.2d at 130.
7. Id. Although the defendant hospital had brought actions for contribution and in-
demnity against the manufacturer and distributor of the drug and vial, who had settled with
plaintiff for $35,000 prior to commencement of trial, the trial court rendered a take nothing
judgment for the defendant against these parties. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 131. The appellate court's construction was in response to the hospital's argu-
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of plaintiffs damage at $15,000.10
The court of civil appeals held that the administration of the drug was a
sale of a product and that the jury's unfitness finding caused the drug to
breach an implied warranty" under the Uniform Commercial Code 12
made by the defendant hospital to the plaintiff. The treble damages and
attorney's fees provisions of the state's Deceptive Trade Practices-Con-
sumer Protection Act were therefore applicable to the case. 13 Under the
peculiarities of Texas consumer legislation, this holding meant that de-
fendant had to pay plaintiff $30,000 more than her damages, plus attor-
ney's fees. Thus, without fault, defendant became liable for more than
three times the amount it would have had to pay had it actually been con-
victed of negligence. The hospital applied to the state supreme court for a
writ of error, but that court determined the application to be untimely,
concluded that it was deprived of jurisdiction, and left the intermediate
appellate decision standing.
In the second case, Thomas v. St. Joseph Hospital,14 plaintiffs deceased
husband violated his physician's instructions and smoked while in an area
of defendant hospital containing oxygen equipment. As a result, the robe
the decedent was wearing, which the hospital had furnished, was con-
sumed by fire, and the decedent subsequently died of his burns. The jury
absolved defendant hospital of fault in the incident, held that the hospital
was not negligent, and at the same time concluded that the decedent's neg-
ligence was the proximate cause of his death. The trial court rendered
judgment for the defendant.' 5
Plaintiff complained on appeal of the trial court's failure to submit spe-
cial interrogatories concerning the asserted strict tort liability of defendant
hospital. Plaintiffs theory was that the hospital, by supplying a robe that
was not treated with chemicals to make it flame-resistant, had sold the
decedent a defective product. The trial judge's refusal to submit the re-
quested issues was apparently based upon his conclusion that established
authority precluded this theory of liability.
ment on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to justify a similar conclusion by the jury.
Id.
10. Id. at 130.
11, Id. at 131.
12, TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.315 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
13. Id. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1982). The Texas Deceptive Trade Practice Act
specifies four categories that are within the purview of deceptive trade practices; breach of
an implied warranty is one of these areas. d. § 17.50(a)(2). (The title of the statute is a
misnomer, since the practice need not be deceptive to create liability.) At the time of the
incident in question in Truly, the Texas act provided for automatic treble damages in most
cases. It has since been amended to remove this treble liability in most, but not all, cases.
Id. § 17.50(b)(1).
Not all states have similar consumer legislation. But the Truly court's reasoning could be
followed in all states that have adopted the UCC, since it depends on the UCC to supply the
warranty allegedly breached.
14. 618 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
15. Id. at 793. The plaintiff also brought suit against a supplier of gowns for the hospi-
tal, but was unable to establish that the robe company had supplied the particular robe in
question since the hospital obtained robes from several suppliers.
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The court of appeals reversed.' 6 It acknowledged the general rule that
the supplying of a product incident to the performance of health care serv-
ices is not a "sale" by a "seller in the business of selling" products for tort
law purposes. 17 Rather, the court recognized that the use of such a prod-
uct, when related to the hospital's essential professional relationship with
the patient, is a part of the rendition of health care services and is to be
tested by negligence law, not strict liability.18 The court concluded, how-
ever, that the decision not to treat a hospital robe with chemicals was "un-
related" to any health care function.' 9 Hence, the court said that the
furnishing of the robe could be considered a sale, and it remanded for a
new trial on the plaintiff's strict liability claims. 20
Ironically, as in Trulv, this decision left the hospital in a potentially
worse position than if it had been at fault. Had it been convicted of negli-
gence, it could have defeated or offset liability by the decedent's negligence
in causing his own death. The appellate decision meant that the hospital
was faced with defending against liability to which the decedent's negli-
gence furnished no defense and as to which its own innocence from fault
was irrelevant. The hospital applied to the state supreme court for a writ
of error, but that court refused the application and left the intermediate
appellate decision standing.
II. THE "ESSENCE OF THE TRANSACTION" TEST: A MAJORITY RULE
CONFLICTING WITH TRULY AND THOMAS
In the past, when courts have been presented with the question whether
warranty or strict tort liability applies to cases involving intermixed prod-
ucts and services, they have uniformly looked to the "predominant pur-
pose" or "essence of the transaction" in determining whether the sale or
the service aspect was controlling. Courts using this concept have held
that contracts including both services and products are not divisible. This
indivisibility precludes the interpretation that a contract made primarily
for service can give rise to a claim based upon a sale of goods, even when
products are incidentally provided in the course of the service. Thus the
health care provider's claim that it does not engage in sales as a merchant
or promote products that enter the stream of commerce is not an aberra-
tion confined to medical practitioners, but a well-established general prin-
ciple of law, from which Thomas and Trulv signal a significant departure.
A. Development of the Essence Test/or Mixed
Sales-Service Transactions
This section traces the sales-service hybrid through its treatment in gen-
eral nonmedical situations, in early blood bank cases, and finally, in non-
16. Id.
17. Id. at 796.
18. Id. at 796-99.
19. Id. at 797.
20. Id. at 796-97.
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blood bank medical decisions. These cases have entertained a variety of
questions ranging from the proper statute of limitations to the proper the-
ory of suit or the elements of damages, in industries including printing,
publishing, feed-lot management, and hospital care. The results display a
high degree of consistency.
Mixed Sales-Service Transactions Outside the Medical Context. The sales-
service hybrid was examined in a nonmedical situation more than one
hundred years ago, in 1856, in the leading English case of Clay v. Yates.21
The case, which concerned the printing and binding of a book, necessarily
involved both labor and the supplying or incidental sale of binding cloth
and paper to be incorporated in the finished product. The court defined
the issue in Clay v. Yates in the following manner: "[I]t seems to me that
the true criterion is, whether work is the essence of the contract, or whether
it is the materials supplied.'' 22 This early statement that mixed transactions
were to be viewed in their "essence" has been frequently cited in both
English and American decisions.23 Contemporary recognition of the rule
was set forth by the Eighth Circuit in Bonebrake v. Cox 24 in the following
frequently cited formula: "The test for inclusion or exclusion is not
whether [goods and services] are mixed, but . . . whether their predomi-
nant factor, their thrust, their purpose . . . is the rendition of service, with
goods incidentally involved. . . or is a transaction of sale, with labor inci-
dentally involved. '25 This statement was most recently approved in 1978
by the same court system that decided Thomas and Truly. The decision in
R. C Freeman v. Shannon Construction, Inc. 26 cited Bonebrake in holding
that a subcontractor's agreement to supply labor and materials was to be
viewed in its essence, as an agreement for services. Similarly, the time-
tested rule that the predominant purpose of the contract controls the entire
transaction enjoys modern acceptance in virtually all jurisdictions.27
The reasons underlying the rule are seldom expressed in the decisions,
21. 25 L.J. Ex. 237, 156 Eng. Rep. 1123 (1856).
22. Id. at 1125 (emphasis added).
23. Lee v. Griffin, 1 B. & S. 272, 121 Eng. Rep. 716 (1861); accord H.G. Adair Printing
Co. v. Ames, 364 Ill. 342, 4 N.E.2d 481 (1936); Gross Income Tax Div. v. W.B. Conkey Co.,
228 Ind. 352, 90 N.E.2d 805 (1950).
24. 499 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1974).
25. Id. at 960.
26. 560 S.W.2d 732, 738-39 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
27. See, e.g., North Am. Leisure Corp. v. A & B Duplicators, Ltd., 468 F.2d 695, 697-98
(2d Cir. 1972) (supply of tapes, cassettes and cartridges in connection with reproducing
master tape); Lincoln Pulp & Paper Co. v. Dravo Corp., 436 F. Supp. 262, 275-76 (N.D. Me.
1977) (furnishing of materials and equipment pursuant to engineering contract); Ranger
Constr. Co. v. Dixie Floor Co., 433 F. Supp. 442, 444-45 (D.S.C. 1977) (provision of resilient
flooring materials under construction subcontract); United States v. Akron Mechanical Con-
tractors, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 496, 499 (D. Md. 1970) (materials used for renovation project);
Gulash v. Stylarama, Inc., 33 Conn. Supp. 108, 364 A.2d 1221, 1224 (C.P. 1975) (installation
of above-ground swimming pool); J & R Elec. Div. of J.O. Mory Stores, Inc. v. Skoog Con-
str. Co., 38 Ill. App. 3d 747, 348 N.E.2d 474, 477 (1976) (installation of electrical equipment);
Cork Plumbing Co. v. Martin Bloom Assocs., 573 S.W.2d 947, 958 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978)
(materials under plumbing construction contract); Air Heaters, Inc. v. Johnson Elec., Inc.,
258 N.W.2d 649, 651-53 (N.D. 1977) (design and installation of electrical system); Van Sis-
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but they are based on sound policy. The sale of a product is a discrete,
isolated event, and the product can sensibly be subjected to expectations of
uniformity. Therefore, miscarriages in its production can be fairly attrib-
uted to its source even in the absence of fault. A service, on the other
hand, is an event with a time duration. It requires not uniformity, but
adjustment to surrounding circumstances. Fault-free accidents in the pro-
vision of services are not as clearly attributable fairly to the service pro-
vider. The inquiry more appropriately focuses upon the quality
(reasonableness) of the service. This focus entails the rhetoric of negli-
gence, not strict liability. If it were possible, however, to treat service
transactions as sales because products were incidentally involved, most
such transactions would be converted into occasions for strict liability.
The service provider would then become an insurer, despite the inappro-
priateness of that role, because service providers almost always use, lend,
or incidentally furnish products in the provision of the service. Alter-
nately, the result might be irrational adjudication, in which the chance de-
gree of proximity of damage to an identifiable product would determine
whether a fault-free service provider was liable.
Thus, a simple dividing line between sales and services is needed, a di-
viding line that can be readily understood and readily, even though not
unerringly, applied. The essence or predominant purpose test fits this need
as well as can be expected of legal line-drawing. Liability is relatively pre-
dictable under it, and service providers can rely upon it. The service pur-
chaser is able to receive individualized treatment under this test2 8-a
benefit that would be less likely if providers were induced by insurers to
make their services uniform to avoid fluctuations of risk.
The Mixed Sales-Service Hybrid in the Medical Context. The first influen-
tial consideration of the sales-service hybrid in the medical context was in
1954, in a blood transfusion case. The court in Perlmutter v. Beth David
Hospital29 stated the rule that is now generally followed: "Concepts of
purchase and sale cannot separately be attached to the healing materials-
such as medicines, drugs or, indeed, blood . . . . 3 This interpretation
follows the rule applied in nonmedical situations that a contract for serv-
ices cannot be divided into a sale of goods and a sale of services. The court
relied expressly on the essence test, holding that since the transaction was
not a sale, the hospital was not liable without fault under a warranty the-
ory for the infusion of infected blood into the patient.3' Virtually all juris-
dictions considering the problem have adhered to this approach to blood
transfusions.32 For example, the recent case of Foster v. Memorial Hospital
tine v. Tollard, 95 Wis. 2d 678, 291 N.W.2d 636, 639 (Ct. App. 1980) (miscellaneous home
remodeling work and materials).
28. See generally Sales, The Service-Sales Transaction: A Citadel Under Assault, 10 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 13 (1978).
29. 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
30. 123 N.E.2d at 794.
31. Id. at 796.
32. See, e.g., Shepard v. Alexian Bros. Hosp., Inc., 33 Cal. App. 3d 606, 611-12, 109 Cal.
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Association33 followed Perlmutter and adopted its reasoning. The court in
Foster declined to categorize a blood transfusion as a sale.34 In rejecting
hospital liability, the court concluded:
There is a reasonable difference between a merchant on the one hand
who is engaged in the active promotion and sale of his product such as
coca cola bottles, automobile axles, or standardized drugs and a doc-
tor, dentist or lawyer on the other hand who supplies medicine, blood,
tooth fillings, or legal briefs in the course of his professional relation-
ship with a patient or client.35
The holdings in Perlmutter and Foster that the provision of blood was a
service, not a sale, were followed in Texas in Goelz v. J.K & Susie L. Wad-
ley Research Institute & Blood Bank.36 Goelz has been cited by one Texas
court as supporting the rule that health care providers do not engage in
sales when furnishing goods incident to services. 37 The Tru/y and Thomas
decisions are aberrations in this precedential context.38
Significantly, early cases such as Perlmutter concerned blood transfu-
sions. Blood presents special difficulties since it is much in demand and
detection or elimination of certain risks is impossible. Therefore, even af-
ter the early blood cases the question whether a health care provider could
be considered a seller of other medical products arguably remained open.
The same principle has emerged from medical cases not involving blood,.
however. For example, in declining to apply strict liability for the use of a
defective surgical needle, the court in Silverhart v. Mount Zion Hospita/3 9
reasoned that the definition of a seller, under either implied warranty or
Rptr. 132, 134-35 (1973) (hospital held not liable for provision of blood in suit based on
implied warranty). This approach led some states to hold blood banks liable, since they
made sales unaccompanied by service, even as those same states held hospitals not liable.
Compare Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Bank v. Hansen, 579 P.2d 1158 (Colo. 1978) (suit on
implied warranty stated cause of action because transaction constituted sale as to blood
bank) with St. Luke's Hosp. v. Schmaltz, 188 Colo. 353, 534 P.2d 781 (1975) (no sale under
implied warranty theory and strict liability theory as applied to hospital; relying on essence
test); and compare Rostocki v. Southwest Fla. Blood Bank, Inc., 276 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 1973)
(blood from blood bank constituted sale for implied warranty purposes) with White v. Sara-
sota County Pub. Hosp. Bd., 206 So. 2d 19 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (hospital that furnished
patient blood purchased from blood bank properly dismissed from cause because no sale for
purposes of implied warranty), cert. denied, 211 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 1968). The court in Cun-
ningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 47 I11. 2d 43, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970), held the hospital
liable as seller of transfused blood. The Cunningham decision prompted a majority of juris-
dictions to adopt statutes that limit liability for transfusion-related hepatitis to negligence.
See generally Franklin, Tort Liabili or Hepatitis.- An Analysis and a Proposal, 24 STAN. L.
REV. 439, 474-79 (1972).
33. 219 S.E.2d 916 (W. Va. 1975).
34. Id. at 920.
35. Id. (footnote omitted).
36. 350 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
37. Potts v. W.Q. Richards Memorial Hosp., 558 S.W.2d 939, 946 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1977, no writ).
38. The Truly opinion declined to follow Perlmutter and cited as authority Cunningham
v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 47 Ill. 2d 43, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970), although the Cunningham
holding was overruled by statute and has enjoyed little acceptance. See infra note 46.
39. 20 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 1028, 98 Cal. Rptr. 187, 191 (1971).
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strict liability, suggests an entity that actively promotes a product or is usu-
ally involved in the business of selling. As the court observed,
A hospital is not ordinarily engaged in the business of selling any of
the products or equipment it uses in providing such services. The es-
sence of the relationship between a hospital and its patients does not
relate essentially to any product or piece of equipment it uses but to
the professional services it provides. 40
Silverhart represents a consistent application of the essence of the transac-
tion test.4 '
Thus the essence or predominant purpose test appeared to be settled law
in many jurisdictions42 until the decisions in Truly and Thomas. An anal-
ysis of the opinions in these two decisions indicates a departure from gen-
erally accepted views by the Truly court43 and a novel interpretation of the
"essence of the transaction" test by the Thomas court.
B. The Court's Analysis: Rejection of the Essence Test
In Providence Hospital v. Truly4 4 the court of appeals erroneously
treated the service-or-sale issue as one of first impression. 45 It discussed
the reasoning of cases involving nonstatutory claims, such as those based
upon strict liability in tort or implied warranty under common law, but
refused to apply those principles, including the essence test, to the case
before it.46 The court apparently considered the Texas Deceptive Trade
40. Id. at 1027, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 190-91.
41. Id. at 1026-27, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 190; see Cheshire v. Southampton Hosp. Ass'n, 53
Misc. 2d 355, 278 N.Y.S.2d 531 (Sup. Ct. 1967); accord Dorney v. Harris, 482 F. Supp. 323
(D. Colo. 1980); Carmichael v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1971); Magrine
v. Krasnica, 94 N.J. 228, 227 A.2d 539 (Hudson County Ct. 1967). afdsub noma. Magrine v.
Spector, 100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968), a/i'd, 53 N.J. 259,
250 A.2d 129 (1969).
42. See, e.g., Potts v. W.Q. Richards Memorial Hosp. 558 S.W.2d 939, 946 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1977, no writ); Shivers v. Good Shepherd Hosp., Inc., 427 S.W.2d 104, 105-
06 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1968, writ refd n.r.e.); see also supra note 41 and cases cited
therein.
43. 611 S.W.2d 127, 131 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, writ dism'd) (refusing to follow
cases such as Vergott v. Deseret Pharmaceutical Co., 463 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1972)).
44. 611 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, writ dism'd).
45. Id. at 131; see Potts v. W.Q. Richards Memorial Hosp., 558 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1977, no writ). The Pots decision dealt with a decedent who had been
supplied both goods and services during her stay in the hospital. The issue was whether the
hospital could maintain any part of its action under article 2 of the Texas Business and
Commerce Code, thus receiving the benefit of the four-year statute of limitations specified in
§ 2.725. The court addressed the issue in the following manner:
Texas follows the majority rule that the essence of a hospital stay is the fur-
nishing of the institution's healing services which may include incidental sales
of medicines and the like . . . . Likewise, we are of the opinion that the es-
sence of this transaction was predominately the furnishing of hospital service
as opposed to the sale of goods.
558 S.W.2d at 946 (citations omitted; emphasis added). The court further stated explicitly
that the four-year statute of limitations under the Texas Business and Commerce Code did
not apply. Id.
46. 611 S.W.2d at 131-33; see Vergott v. Deseret Pharmaceutical Co., 463 F.2d 12 (5th
Cir. 1972) (dictum); Shivers v. Good Shepherd Hosp., Inc., 427 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1968, writ refd n.r.e.) (dictum). In refusing to follow the direction established
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Practices-Consumer Protection Act, which incorporates the sale and war-
ranty definitions of the UCC, as different in scope. 47 The court did not
cite, and was evidently unaware of, the body of authority applying to the
UCC the same essence test that is generally used to differentiate sales from
services in common law and tort claims.
The Truly court based its conclusion in part upon the absence of any
express statutory exclusion of medical services from coverage as sales. In
the wake of early blood bank litigation, the state legislature had passed an
express statutory exemption of transfused blood from treatment as a sale. 48
by the courts in Vergott and Shivers the court in 7-uly decided that the essence test was not a
firmly accepted proposition. The Truly court characterized the leading case in support of the
essence test, Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (Ct. App. 1954),
as one that "has been followed, questioned, criticized, and rejected." 611 S.W.2d at 132 n.2.
While literally true, this statement fails to reflect the overwhelming weight of authority fol-
lowing Perlmutter or the short life of the major case rejecting it. The Truly court looked to
the authority of Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 47 Ill. 2d 43, 266 N.E.2d 897
(1970), the leading case rejecting Perlmutter, as support for its position. 611 S.W.2d at 132
n.2. The reaction to this decision has been succinctly described by a distinguished commen-
tator on drug products liability law.
In a leading 1970 case, the medical and hospital world was shocked when
strict liability for transfusion hepatitis was applied to a hospital [citing Cun-
ningham]. Here the Illinois Supreme Court ignored precedents from other
jurisdictions and applied strict tort liability to blood transfusions. The court
held that the hospital was in the business of selling blood products incidental
to its other duties, but nevertheless, engaging in a sale rather than a service.
The court noted that whole blood was a product even though it had not under-
gone processing.
The Cunningham decision opened the floodgates, but not to litigation. As a
result of this decision, the legislators of every state were bombarded with a
lobbying effort to reverse or prevent the application of Cunningham. As a
result, most states now have statutes which characterize the transfusion of
blood as a service rather than a sale for the purposes of applying strict liability
in tort.
M. DIXON, DRUG PRODUCT LIABILITY § 9.08(4), at 9-119 to -120 (1981) (footnotes and cita-
tions omitted).
47. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1982). The Truly court
supported its conclusion that a sale had been made by observing that the hospital had billed
the patient for an item construed by the court as recovery for drugs provided during surgery.
611 S.W.2d at 131. This reasoning seems particularly suspect, since it would make liability
depend upon the form of invoice sent the patient after the injury.
48. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590-3 (Vernon 1976). The statute is similar
to those in effect elsewhere and provides in part:
No physician, surgeon, hospital, blood bank. . . or other person or entity who
donates, obtains, prepares. . . transfuses or otherwise transfers, or who assists
or participates in obtaining, preparing . . transfusing . . . blood . . . from
one or more human beings. . . to another human being, shall be liable as the
result of any such activity, save and except that each such person or entity
shall remain liable for his or its own negligence.
Id. § 2. Policy reasons for limiting liability were stated by the legislature:
The availability of scientific knowledge, skills and materials for the. . . trans-
fusion. . . of human. . . blood. . . is important to the health and welfare of
the people of this State. The imposition of legal liability without fault upon
the persons and organizations engaged in such scientific procedures inhibits
the exercise of sound medical judgment and restricts the availability of impor-
tant scientific knowledge, skills and materials. It is therefore the public policy
of this State to promote the health and welfare of the people by limiting the
1982]
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The narrowness of this exemption proved persuasive to the court. The
court concluded that the legislature's failure to exempt expressly other
medical transactions constituted an implied legislative recognition that
medical transactions other than transfusions, although incidental to serv-
ices, could constitute sales. 49 Again, the court failed to deal with the body
of applicable authority. It did not recognize that controlling cases ex-
cluded blood from consideration even before the statutory exemption, on
grounds generally applicable to mixed sales-service transactions.50 More
importantly, it failed to recognize that controlling case law after the statu-
tory exemption of blood continued to apply the essence test to determine
whether a transaction was a sale or service.5'
The Truly court's finding of a sale, furthermore, required considerable
stretching of commercial concepts. To be termed a "sale" 52 under the
UCC, a transaction must result in "passing of title" 53 from buyer to seller.
Application of UCC provisions also requires an assumption that notions of
intent to form a contract, offer, and acceptance characterize incidental uses
of products between a health care professional and his patient. A product
used by a physician to treat an unconscious patient, whether it be a clamp,
a stretcher, an injected fluid, or a strand of suture, fits this framework only
with difficulty. Finally, the use of such commercial concepts in a health
care setting should be affected by the Code's official commentary, which
provides that whether entities should be considered merchants depends
upon the standards of skill and judgment that can appropriately be applied
to them.54 Application of the commentary to a hospital would emphasize
as controlling the fact that its skill and judgment rests in the provision of
services rather than in sales of goods.
legal liability arising out of such scientific procedures to instances of
negligence.
Id. § 1.
49. 611 S.W.2d at 132-33.
50. See, e.g., Goelz v. J.K. & Susie L. Wadley Research Inst. & Blood Bank, 350
S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
51. Potts v. W.Q. Richards Memorial Hosp., 558 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1977, no writ).
52. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2-106(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) provides: "A
'sale' consists in the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price."
53. Id. § 2-401(b) provides: "Unless otherwise explicitly agreed title passes to the buyer
at the time and place at which the seller completes his performance with reference to the
physical delivery of the goods ....
54. Id. § 2-315. The Code states the general conditions necessary for an implied war-
ranty to arise:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particu-
lar purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on
the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless
excluded or modified under the next section an implied warranty that the
goods shall be fit for such purpose.
Id.
In applying the section on implied warranty, the following comments and definitions from
the Code indicate that a health care provider does not fit the Code's recognized concept of a
merchant. "Although normally the warranty will arise only where the seller is a merchant
with the appropriate 'skill or judgment', it can arise as to non-merchants where this is justi-
fied by the particular circumstances." Id. comment 4.
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In fact, as the defendants in both Truly and Thomas argued, hospitals
can more readily be viewed as consumers of products than sellers. They
purchase a bewildering array of goods and must depend, as do consumers,
upon manufacturers for prevention of latent defects. They do not usually
promote the sale of these goods or make individual contractual arrange-
ments with patients for them. While they have responsibility for selection
of an appropriate product, and they are liable if they discharge that func-
tion unreasonably, selection is an act forming part of the hospital's service
and is cognizable under negligence principles.
These concerns aside, the Truly court's analysis has at least two poten-
tially troublesome implications: The concept of sale is substantially en-
larged, and the variety of parties able to make a sale is similarly increased.
The expanded concept of a sale in Truly makes virtually every health care
accident susceptible to an action under implied warranty since most health
care involves the use or provision of some external product or material,
and miscarriages or failures generally involve or are affected by products.
Truly indicates that even when products are initially defect-free and mal-
function without fault on the provider's part during the health care serv-
ice,55 the health care provider may be subjected to liability; indeed,
precisely that result was reached in Truly. Thus a sale expands to include
not only the isolated event of providing the product, but assurance of the
ongoing function of the product in the process of health care. 56 The fol-
lowing examples illustrate possible results under Truly's reasoning:
1. During a mitral valve replacement, the physician installs a valve
that is ostensibly free of defect. Owing to unrelated events, the patient
dies, and during the course of the procedure, the mitral valve mal-
functions and becomes defective or "unfit" (as it naturally would).
This malfunction is the immediate cause of death (as it naturally
would be). The court's opinion in Truly would convert the survivor's
claim for such a malfunction into a no-fault action.
2. A surgeon performs sutures with gut that is free of defect. The
procedure requires a lengthy healing process (usually, gut is used
when it is to be assimilated into the tissues). While the health care
process initiated by the surgery is still continuing and the patient re-
mains confined in the hospital, the sutures break for reasons unrelated
to any inherent defect in the material (an occurrence that is common
in the use of gut). The "product" "sold" to the patient is now "unfit"
and the implied "warranty" is "breached." Any damages incurred by
55. The Truly court did not consider it significant that the product was initially defect-
free. According to the court, the medical service itself caused a non-negligent miscarriage in,
its handling while the operation was ongoing. Furthermore, it was not until considerably
after the patient's release that all of the evidence considered by the court in characterizing
the transaction as a sale coalesced, because the court considered the bill to the patient in this
respect. 611 S.W.2d at 131.
56. The situation in the Truly case involved allegations by the plaintiff, Mrs. Truly, that
the stopper on the vial of the drug was loose and became contaminated during contact with
sterilized solution. Although the jury absolved the defendant hospital of any negligence, it
found that the provision of the contaminated drug, regardless of when or how it became
contaminated, was a breach of an implied warranty. Id. at 130.
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the patient are, now, the subject of a no-fault claim, and the hospital,
(which supplied sound materials and is free of negligence), may even
be liable for treble damages under broad consumer protection laws
such as the one in question in Truly.
3. An anesthesiologist administers halothane. Unbeknownst to him
or to the practitioner of his day, this anesthesia causes severe damage
to internal organs of certain genetically disposed persons-not on the
first application, but on the second, according to a mechanism that is
little understood. The patient, undergoing his second application,
dies. The non-negligent anesthesiologist has "sold" a product that is
"unfit"-and is strictly liable.
Under these scenarios, Truly means that the medical professional becomes
not a mere provider of services, but an insurer of desired results from the
entire panoply of health care products.
The second major implication of the Truly opinion is its expansion of
the group of sellers to include all providers of service.5 7 As an example,
the Truly decision would mean that an attorney's filing of a petition or
complaint would become a sale of the document to the client. Consider an
outlandish, but nevertheless real, possibility: If a lawyer filing a petition or
complaint in a medical malpractice case prior to Truly failed to anticipate
the Truly result, and therefore failed to allege a strict liability claim, the
petition itself would arguably breach a warranty to the patient-client and
would give rise to a strict liability claim against the plaintiff's lawyer under
the Truly court's reasoning. This result follows from the conclusion that
the petition could, under the Truly reasoning, be considered a product or
good sold to the client. It would be unfit and would thus breach an im-
plied warranty. This conclusion especially follows if the lawyer has, as is
customary even in contingent fee cases, charged a suit fee or caused his
contractual contingent fee to graduate upon filing of the suit. The conver-
sion of the lawyer's professional services into the sale of a good, giving rise
to a no-fault suit, would naturally follow from the Truly court's opinion.
These logical implications from the Truly opinion are not the intended
results of the legislature's grant of immunity from implied warranties for
blood banks. 58 The legislature did not envision the adoption of the UCC
or consumer legislation as a method for holding professionals who are free
from fault liable for more damages than if they had been convicted of
negligence. The Truly decision, however, does more than contravene the
legislative intent. Its abandonment of the widely sanctioned essence test
makes new law without appropriate analysis of either past decisions or
future consequences.
57. The concern that this implication creates was voiced by the court in Foster v. Me-
morial Hosp. Ass'n, 219 S.E.2d 916 (W. Va. 1975). See supra text accompany.ing note 35.
58. See supra note 48 for the legislature's statement of public policy considerations un-
derlying the grant of immunity to blood providers. The legislature seemingly did not intend
for this statute to extend liability, which previously did not exist, in all other circumstances.
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C Thomas v. St. Joseph Hospital: An Exception Swallows the Rule
The confusion created by the Truly court's failure to follow the essence
test also characterized the court of appeals' opinion in Thomas v. St. Joseph
Hospital.59 The Thomas court, however, reached its result by a fundamen-
tally different route. As had the court in Truly, the court in Thomas began
by observing that the case was one of first impression. 60 The court recog-
nized the line of cases that had applied the sales-service concept to medical
professionals and agreed that the essence of the transaction between a doc-
tor and patient was the rendering of service. 61 The court further accepted
the view that strict liability was inappropriate when no product was al-
leged to be defective62 or "when the professional services could not have
been rendered without using the product. ' 63 But in making this last dis-
tinction, the court retreated from a full application of the essence test and
held that: "Where, as here, a hospital apparently supplies a product unre-
lated to the essential professional relationship, we hold that it cannot be
said as a matter of law the hospital did not introduce the harmful product
into the stream of commerce."'64 Thus the Thomas court did not actually
view the controlling question as dependent upon the essence of the trans-
action. It appears to have asked, instead, whether the product was so es-
sential to the service that the service could not be performed without the
product-a focus that has never before characterized the sales-service
cases. Having pronounced the surgical gown not "essential" to the hospi-
tal service in question, the court followed with the questionable conclusion
that it was therefore "unrelated" to the service. 65 Through this reasoning,
Thomas's wearing of the gown became a sale implicating strict liability
principles. 66
This novel interpretation of the sales-service concept allows some prod-
ucts to be viewed as separate from the basic service transaction while
others are not, even though all are used as part of an ongoing health care
process. Whether this reasoning was intended is uncertain, because the
opinion supports this new rule by citing two cases in which the profes-
sional services in question could not have been rendered without the prod-
ucts involved. 67 However these inconsistencies are resolved, the Thomas
court's conclusion that products not essential, or not related, to the profes-
59. 618 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
60. Id. at 796.
61. id.
62. Id.; see Barbee v. Rogers, 425 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. 1968).
63. 618 S.W.2d at 796.
64. Id. at 796-97.
65. Id.
66. Texas courts have recognized, as have many jurisdictions, that the exchange of
goods for money with passage of title is not always necessary for an entity providing goods
to be considered a seller under strict tort liability. Lessors were recognized as liable in
Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. 1975), as were bailors in Armstrong Rubber Co. v.
Urquidez, 570 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. 1978). Truly, however, is based on a statutory claim that
includes a statutory definition of sale, and the tort concept is therefore inapplicable.
67. 618 S.W.2d at 797 (citing Providence Hosp. v. Truly, 611 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1980, writ dism'd) (contaminated drug provided during course of surgical pro-
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sional relationship are a basis for imposition of strict liability upon health
care providers poses numerous problems. Future litigation may be com-
plicated by determinations of relationships between doctor, patient, and
product. Erosion of the sales-service distinction may result in legal deci-
sions in areas of medical judgment that could significantly affect the ad-
ministration of health services.
The Thomas fact situation is itself an example. The court's conclusion
that the surgical gown provided the patient could have been treated with
flame retardant chemicals so as to prevent the occurrence 68 ignores self-
evident countervailing medical considerations. 69 Chemical treatment may
not be medically wise when the fabric is to be used around the clock next
to the skin of a patient who spends most of his time in bed and who is
especially prone to the contraction of bedsores. Prevention of this skin
condition requires, among other treatments, the frequent changing of posi-
tion of bedridden patients. The Federal Trade Commission required one
flame retardant chemical, Tris, to be withdrawn from the market because it
proved to be a carcinogen to the skin of those who wore fabrics treated
with it. The use of chemically drenched fabrics might particularly be con-
traindicated for patients with poor circulation, epidermal difficulties, or
respiratory problems. Since most hospital patients would fall into these
categories, sound medical judgment would not be indifferent to the use of
such fabrics, as the Thomas court seems to assume it would be. To prem-
ise liability on the conclusion that the gown is not essential, or that it is not
related to the hospital's provision of medical care, ignores the proper con-
sideration of all these medical questions in the hospital's overall rendition
of care. This approach would mandate legal evaluation of a vast array of
products used in a medical setting. Also, to the extent this approach had
an effect on hospital decisions (as tort rules are intended to do), it would
encourage a health care provider to choose a product based on considera-
tions other than medical suitability.
cedure); Texsun Feed Yards, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 447 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1971) (feed
provided as part of nutrition service)).
68. 618 S.W.2d at 797-98. The Thomas court also noted that a fabric can be made more
flame resistant by choice of the raw material from which it is made. Id. For example, wool,
an animal fabric that is superior to cotton when flame resistance alone is considered, may be
used instead of cotton. But again, the substitution of wool for cotton in hospital gowns is
probably not a matter of medical indifference, as the court tacitly assumed it is. In fact, no
readily available natural or synthetic fibres allow the wearer's skin to transpire (or breathe)
as does cotton, which was the material actually used in Thomas. Cotton is lightweight, soft,
and nonabrasive. It is an ideal fabric for sensitive skin. Furthermore, it cleans and sterilizes
with greater ease and more completely than many other fabrics.
69. Actually, flame resistance is only one of many features that may be significant to a
physician in the choice of a gown. Access to all parts of the body for treatment or surgery
would appear medically necessary. Thus a pants-and-shirt arrangement, as in traditional
pajamas, might be medically contraindicated. The fastening mechanisms of a hospital gown
should not be sharp, hard, or pointed so as to irritate the skin of a patient confined to bed for
great parts of the day; nor should they consist of drawstrings or ties that are either difficult to
remove or capable of choking a patient unable to move easily. All these features, as well as
the choice of fabric might be considered differently by a provider of health care services than
by others. But the Thomas court's opinion consigns all such concerns to medical irrelevance,
holding that the gown itself is unrelated to the professional service. Id. at 796.
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Furthermore, the Thomas court stated that questions regarding the rela-
tionship of the product, in this case a hospital gown, to the professional
service can not be decided as a matter of law.70 As a result, juries must
confront a new standard for assessing the propriety of medical decisions.
Difficulties inherent in the use of expert medical testimony in malpractice
cases, which produce lengthy and confusing trials, are significant enough.
But the usual standard of care in such cases, that of negligence, is at least
workable. After Thomas, a case incidentally involving a product may be
further complicated as medical experts, product purchasing experts, and
physicians seek to clarify the nature of the product and its relationship to
doctor and patient in an effort to show that the product is or is not essential
or that it is or is not related to the health care service. Even if such a basis
for imposition or nonimposition of liability were feasible, it seems likely to
produce arbitrary results.
Nevertheless, if properly used, the basic proposition underlying the
Thomas court's opinion is sound despite its problems. When a hospital
ceases to act as a health care provider selling services and embarks upon
an extraneous commercial business in which it sells and promotes prod-
ucts, it should be subject to different rules. Thus, if a hospital were to open
a used-car lot across the street, it would not be able to claim that it was not
liable to injured purchasers of defective vehicles merely because it pro-
vided health care services in its unrelated hospital facility. Likewise, if a
hospital were to operate a public cafeteria and sell a nonpatient a
hamburger containing a foreign ingredient, it would be in the position of
any other restauranteur. 7 1 However, the Thomas court's strange conclu-
sion that a hospital robe may be in a category with an unrelated used-car
lot or public cafeteria honors the "essence of the transaction" rule more in
the breach than in the observance. The Thomas court asked the question,
"When is a hospital robe not a hospital robe?" and, in providing an answer
to this extraneous question, created an exception that swallows the rule.
III. ECONOMIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS UNDERLYING STRICT
LIABILITY AND THEIR RELEVANCE IN THE HEALTH CARE
CONTEXT
The theories of implied warranty and strict tort liability are based upon
several economic policy considerations. This section will examine those
considerations and discuss their application to recovery from health care
providers. In particular, this section seeks to discern the extent to which
the economic goals of strict liability are furthered by application to health
70. Id. at 796-97.
71. Similar hypothetical situations were posited by the courts in Silverhart v. Mount
Zion Hosp., 20 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 98 Cal. Rptr. 187, 191 n.4 (1971), and Perlmutter v. Beth
David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792, 795-96 (Ct. App. 1954). These courts agreed
with the analysis given here. In particular, Silverhart expressly rejected the possibility that a
lawyer could become liable as a seller of goods in such a situation. 20 Cal. App. 3d at 1027,
98 Cal. Rptr. at 190.
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service providers and whether potential benefits outweigh costs to the
public.
A. Implied Warranty
The generally recognized purposes of warranty law are to protect the
buyer's expectation interest, to promote the continued expansion of com-
mercial practices, and to establish appropriate commercial standards of
reasonableness and fair dealing. 72 Courts have typically enforced these
interests in situations involving economic loss. This concept includes the
cost of the warranted goods and any incidental or consequential damages
resulting from the provision of substandard goods.7 3 In assessing damages
for such economic loss, the courts encourage merchants to provide goods
of a quality and in a manner reasonably expected by the consumer.74
These goals of warranty law have little relevance when applied to the
health care provider. The consumer in a health care facility does not com-
plain that medicines were supplied by an off-brand manufacturer or that
the sutures used in an operation did not meet his specifications. Rather,
his concern is with the overall result of the service. Furthermore, the ex-
pectancy interest protected by warranty law assumes a market for goods,
regulated by supply and demand, in which quality and price are negoti-
ated. The average consumer-patient does not go to the hospital expecting
to bargain with the doctor or pharmacist for an appropriate price for inci-
dentally used products.
Warranty law leaves open the question of compensable losses. Its flex-
ibility is characterized by the UCC's suggestion that leading court cases
guide the imposition of consequential damages.75 The question whether
such damages should be awarded for personal injuries caused by a hospi-
72. See U.C.C. §§ 1-102(2)(b), 2-103(l)(b), 2-314(1), (2)(c) (1976) and official comments
therein. For a discussion of the economic role of contract damages, see R. POSNER, Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW §§ 4.1, 4.9 (2d ed. 1977).
73. In the jurisdiction in which Truly and Thomas were decided, for example, the courts
have tended to construe economic loss narrowly. See, e.g., Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc. v.
Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977), in which the court held that strict tort liability was not
the proper theory for recovery of economic losses, but that the UCC "was drafted specifi-
cally to govern commercial losses and obviously provides the proper remedies to cover such
losses." Id. at 80. But see Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Prods., 572 S.W.2d 320,
325 (Tex. 1978) (holding that the consequential damages provision provides for damages to
the consumer user or his property). Although the Signal Oil & Gas court extended warranty
theory beyond the coverage contemplated by Nobility Homes, it simultaneously created a
requirement not generally associated with warranty. It held that personal injuries must be
predicated on reasonable use and proximate causation in order to be compensable as conse-
quential damages. Id. at 328. The holding thus resembles tort liability. Indeed, the court so
recognized; it said, "Such a reasonable use standard is normally associated with theories of
negligence." Id. See also Garcia v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 610 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. 1980)
(UCC establishes alternative remedy for personal injuries resulting from breach of implied
warranty of merchantability).
74. See, e.g., Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., I Ohio App. 2d 374, 205 N.E.2d 92, 93
(1965); see also R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 3.6-.7 (ist ed. 1973).
75. U.C.C. § 1-106 (1976) comment 3 states: "'Consequential' or 'special' damages and
'penal' damages are not defined in terms in the Code, but are used in the sense given them
by the leading cases on the subject."
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tal-provided product had not been answered by a Texas court prior to the
Truly decision. 76 That problem was, however, addressed by the court in
Foster v. Memorial Hospital Association :77
The hospital has not undertaken to be an insurer in this type of
situation and the Court finds that holding the hospital liable today
would encourge a gradual expansion of the doctrine of warranty to
permit recovery in situations totally outside the intent of the warranty
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code which have historically
required negligence. 78
A similar response was delivered by the court in Cheshire v. Southampton
Hospital Association,79 which stated: "[A] warranty theory [is] not avail-
able to a patient complaining of an isolated part of his treatment as being a
warranted sale." °80 These leading decisions indicate that personal injury
cases arising from products provided by medical professionals are not
compensable as consequential damages under warranty law.
Thus courts in other jurisdictions, as well as the Uniform Commercial
Code, indicate that economic contract interests and remedies are not rele-
vant to the fact situations that arise when personal injuries are sustained as
a result of defective products provided by medical professionals.8' If lia-
bility without fault is expanded to hold health care providers liable for
personal injuries caused by products, it should be based instead on the
policy considerations underlying strict tort liability. The economic consid-
erations underlying that doctrine are more clearly directed toward remedy-
ing such injuries. Even in this latter area, however, accomplishment of
underlying economic purposes may be slight and detriments to the public
as patients may be great.
76. Courts in the jurisdiction in which Truly and Thomas were decided have com-
mented on the inapplicability of warranty law to the provision of goods related to medical
services, but have not rendered a decision directly on the question of consequential dam-
ages. In Shivers v. Good Shepherd Hosp., Inc., 427 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1968, writ refd n.r.e.), the court declined to impose negligence on the hospital because of
charitable immunity, which was then still viable. It went on to discuss the hospital's liability
if charitable immunity had not been protective:
It will. . . be noted that the two cases. . .[Jacob . Decker & Sons v. Capps
and McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc.] apply the rule of strict liability and im-
plied warranty to the manufacturer and distributor of a product. If this is to
be the extent of the rule, then the appellee [hospital] will not be liable under
the strict liability and implied warranty rule applied in those cases.
Id. at 107. A more recent case, Potts v. W.Q. Richards Memorial Hosp., 558 S.W.2d 939
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, no writ), decided that the hospital could not seek contract
damages under the UCC for remaining fees merely because goods had been provided inci-
dent to the patient's stay in the hospital. The hospital was attempting to bring the cause of
action under the four-year statute of limitations applicable to sales of goods. Id. at 946.
77. 219 S.E.2d 916 (W. Va. 1975).
78. Id. at 920.
79. 53 Misc. 2d 355, 278 N.Y.S.2d 531 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967); see also La Rossa v. Scien-
tific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937, 942-43 (3d Cir. 1968) ("professional services form a marked
contrast to consumer products cases").
80. 53 Misc. 2d at 356, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 532.
81. See supra note 32 (regarding court decisions); supra note 72 (regarding the UCC).
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B Strict Tort Liability
The fundamental purpose underlying the doctrine of strict tort liability
is to further public safety in the use of consumer products.8 2 In such a
situation an economist would say that injuries are an externality,8 3 a cost
or benefit external to the market system, causing prices if used alone, to
misallocate resources. Even the most firm supporters of the market recog-
nize the appropriateness of government intervention in response to serious
externalities when such externalities can be addressed in a cost-effective
manner. A pricing remedy,84 such as requiring compensation for dam-
ages, is often preferable to regulation by standards or prohibitions. How-
ever, the remedy should not itself distort the allocation of resources more
seriously than the externality to which it is directed.85
The basic purpose of remedying the externality of injuries without hav-
ing losses exceed gains is arguably achieved by imposing liability without
fault upon entities that have the ability to satisfy three class requirements:
adequate compensation of the injured party, distribution of the risk of loss,
and deterrence from production of defective products.8 6 The appropriate-
ness of applying strict liability to a medical professional thus depends
upon the professional's ability to satisfy these three class requirements.
82. Challoner v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 512 F.2d 77, 84 (5th Cir.), rev'd, 423 U.S. 3
(1975); Hill, How Strict Is Strict? Have the Walls ofthe Citadel Really Crumbled?, 32 TEX.
B.J. 759, 799 (1969); Sales & Perdue, supra note 1, at 5.
83. R. DORFMAN, PRICES AND MARKETS 141-43 (1967); P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS
159, 465-66 (6th ed. 1964). Externalities are factors that are external to the price system, for
which the system does not provide adequate countervailing incentives. A classic example of
an externality is air or water pollution. Although a manufacturer may design a system to
produce a product efficiently and inexpensively, and consumers may be induced by the price
system to purchase this good, consumers might prefer to pay more and reduce pollution.
Governmentally imposed requirements for pollution control equipment may thus add to
costs in a manner that increases economic efficiency. See R. POSNER, supra note 72, § 13.5.
But cf. infra note 85.
84. The pricing remedy aspect of tort liability allows the promoter of products, some of
which may have caused injury due to defectiveness, to sustain the costs of court judgments,
but to continue producing valuable products. It induces him to balance the benefit of the
product as produced and the cost of injuries exactly as society values these factors. In this
sense, a damage remedy may be more economically efficient than regulations imposed as
safety standards. See R. POSNER, supra note 72, ch. 13 (entitled The Choice Between Regula-
tion and the Common Law) for an analysis of the comparison between pricing and standards
remedies.
85. Posner, for this reason, avoids use of the term "externality" and labels it misleading.
The real issue, for him, is who should be made to bear the cost. The factor controlling that
issue, in turn, is the balance of costs and benefits:
If the joint value of railroading and farming would be maximized by the dis-
continuance of crop production, the substitution of a more fire-resistant crop,
or the removal of the crop to some distance from the railroad right-of-way,
then placing liability on the railroad [for fire damage due to sparks] would be
inappropriate.
Moreover, "if transaction costs are low, the market may operate efficiently despite the pres-
ence of externalities." R. POSNER, supra note 72, at 52. Posner's analysis is equivalent to
that of other economists, such as Samuelson, who do not avoid reference to externalities, but
it avoids the misleading implication that legal intervention of any particular kind is
required.
86. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment c (1965).
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Although the decisions in Truly and Thomas were concerned with hospi-
tals, the implications of their holdings extend to entities such as clinics,
partnerships, and individual practitioners. These entities may not be able
to spread risk effectively and are not necessarily the most appropriate per-
sons upon whom to place the burden of compensation. 87 Furthermore, the
reasoning does not depend upon the health service provider's control over
non-negligently created defects, and it therefore may not square with the
deterrence rationale.88 Thus the misallocation of resources brought about
by strict liability might amount to a cure that is worse than the disease.
Compensation to the Injured Party. Strict liability is premised in part upon
the assumption that the injured consumer is less able to absorb the risk of
catastrophic loss than the business that provided the injury-causing prod-
uct. 89 As between a non-negligent individual physician and his patients as
a group, this assumption may not be as readily accepted. The courts gen-
erally impose liability upon each step in the distributive chain from manu-
facturer to retailer.90 Three reasons have been stated for imposing strict
liability on intermediaries due to compensation goals.91 First, because
identification of the product manufacturer or distributor may be difficult,
the consumer is left with no definite party to name in a suit. A second
concern is that the party, once identified, may be a foreign corporation not
amenable to jurisdiction. Finally, some links in the distributive chain may
be financially unable to satisfy a judgment. In light of these concerns the
question remains whether the health service provider is an appropriate
link in the distributive chain upon which to impose the needs of
compensation.
Considering the extensive recordkeeping required by state and federal
87. Strict liability of manufacturers and promoters may also be economically unjustified
if the common law regime for its imposition is not congruent with underlying economic
purposes. For example, Posner concludes that unless contributory negligence is a defense
(in many states it is not), strict liability may create diseconomies. R. POSNER, supra note 72,
at 139. An economic critique of strict liability law as applied to the manufacturer would be
valuable, but is beyond the scope of this Article.
88. Cf. Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539 (Hudson County Ct.
1967), aff'dsub nom. Magrine v. Spector, 100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A:2d 637 (Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1968), afl'd, 53 N.J. 259, 250 A.2d 129 (1969) (dentist not held strictly liable for the
provision of a defective needle used while administering treatment). The Mahrine court
emphasized the incongruity of imposing strict liability upon the individual practitioner who
has no control over a defective product.
Further, the vast body of malpractice law, presumably an expression of the
public policy involved in this area of health care, imposes upon a dentist or
physician liability only for negligent performance of his services-negligent
deviation from the standards of his profession. In the performance of his pro-
fessional skill he has control of what he does. As to the instrument he uses, he
has no control with respect to a latent defect therein. Why, then, should he be
held strictly liable for the instruments he uses, as to which he has no control
over latent defects, and liable only for negligence in the performance of his
professional services, which he does control?
227 A.2d at 546.
89. See infra notes 115-21.
90. See generally Sales & Perdue, supra note 1, at 94-102.
91. Id. at 100 (identification), 218 (jurisdiction); see infra note 102 (financial reserve).
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laws, 92 state dangerous drug acts, 93 and state or local controlled substances
acts,94 incidents in which the medical professional will be the only identifi-
able party in the marketing process should be few. The Joint Commission
on Accreditation of Hospitals further demands considerable detail in in-
ventory and accounting procedures covering both consumable and non-
consumable goods.95 These statutes and regulations require specific
identification of a high percentage of goods that are likely to be defective
and cause injury. Thus, when a hospital or other health care provider dis-
penses an injury-producing product, the product can usually be traced to
its manufacturer or supplier. Requiring compensation from that entity
will, almost without fail, be more appropriate for the effectuation of the
economic purposes underlying strict liability.96
Having identified a party or group of parties from whom to seek com-
pensation, an injured consumer must establish jurisdiction over these par-
ties. Application of a long-arm statute97 requires that the plaintiff
demonstrate that the defendant supplier has the requisite contacts with the
state.98 This determination is facilitated by the extensive recordkeeping
required by legal and accreditation standards. 99 Even if the entire volume
of transactions can not be traced, jurisdiction can be established by infer-
ring regular sales. I00 A single purposeful transaction related to the injury
is likely to be enough.' 0 ' If stringent jurisdictional requirements of the
past would have supported an argument for holding medical professionals
liable, today's liberal service of process requirements do not.
The most important concern to the injured party who seeks compensa-
tion is finding a source with adequate financial reserve, or a "deep pocket."
Resources available to members of the distributive chain range from the
abundant for giant drug and chemical companies to the marginal for
smaller concerns that provide items such as laundered goods on a local
92. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 331(e) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (referencing various record-
keeping sections under the Pure Food and Drug Act).
Indeed, in TrulY, plaintiff sued the manufacturers and distributors and settled with them
before trial for more than the amount the jury fixed as her damages. See supra notes 6-13
and accompanying text. In Thomas plaintiff experienced the rare situation in which her
claim failed for inability to identify the manufacturer, because the hospital bought similar
gowns from several suppliers and disposed of the burned article after the incident.
93. E.g., TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4476-14, §§ 5-6 (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1982).
94. Eg., id. art. 4476-15.
95. ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HosPITALS--Pharmaceutical Services 137 (1981).
96. See infra text accompanying notes 115-21 (regarding distribution of losses); infra
notes 122-24 (regarding deterrence).
97. Eg., TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1982).
98. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
99. See supra notes 92-95.
100. See, e.g., Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176
N.E.2d 761 (196 1) (malfunction of foreign-manufactured valve, bought in Illinois, supported
inference that sale of valve was part of larger volume of commercial transactions affecting
Illinois, even in absence of proof of individual transactions).
101. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (single insurance




basis. However uncertain the financial picture may be for manufacturers
and suppliers, the fact that a high percentage of even nonpublic hospitals
operates on a not-for-profit basis 0 2 is an argument for searching for other
financial alternatives. Although circumstances could arise in which the
hospital has a deeper pocket than some small manufacturer or supplier,
the consequences to health care providers in sustaining such awards could
be devastating. 10 3 Since manufacturers or distributors of medical goods
can usually be identified, service of process can be obtained, and sources of
financial reserve that are comparable to or greater than most entities in the
health care field can generally be located, the additional imposition of lia-
bility without fault on the service provider does not advance the compen-
sation purpose as significantly as might appear at first blush.
Distribution of the Risk of Loss. The shifting of the risk of loss from the
consumer to the manufacturer or promoter so that it may be distributed
better is an arguable economic policy objective. Such a shift is advanta-
geous if dangerousness is an externality not reflected in price and if the
risk-distribution benefits of such a shift can fairly be said to exceed detri-
ments.10 4 The question is whether creating such liability for a health serv-
ice provider who furnishes a product incidental to the rendering of medical
services, in addition to imposing liability upon the manufacturer and dis-
tributor, is appropriate. In declining to do so, several courts' 0 5 have cited
as authority the rationale of riskspreading stated in the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts:
On whatever theory, the justification for strict liability has been said
to be that the seller, by marketing his product for use and consump-
tion, has undertaken and assumed a special responsibility toward any
member of the consuming public who may be injured by it; that the
public has the right to and does expect, in the case of products which
it needs and for which it is forced to rely upon the seller, that reputa-
ble sellers will stand behind their goods; that public policy demands
that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products intended for
consumption be placed upon those who market them, and be treated
as a cost of production against which liability insurance can be ob-
102. [1981] HEALTH-UNITED STATES 183. The report indicates that of a total 6525 hospi-
tals, 3436 are voluntary, nonprofit institutions.
103. See infra text accompanying notes 114-21.
104. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
105. Vergott v. Deseret Pharmaceutical Co., 463 F.2d 12, 16 n.5 (5th Cir. 1972); Carmi-
chael v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381, 393 (1971); Magrine v. Krasnica, 94
N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539 (Hudson County Ct. 1967), affidsub nom. Magrine v. Spector,
100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968), aJf'd, 53 N.J. 259, 250 A.2d
129 (1969); accord Shepard v. Alexian Bros. Hosp., Inc., 33 Cal. App. 3d 606, 611, 109 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 134 (1973); Silverhart v. Mount Zion Hosp., 20 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 98 Cal. Rptr.
187, 190-91 (1971); Shivers v. Good Shepherd Hosp., Inc., 427 S.W.2d 104, 107 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Compare, e.g., Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Bank v.
Hansen, 579 P.2d 1158 (Colo. 1978) (suit on implied warranty stated a cause of action be-
cause transaction constituted a sale as to blood bank) with St. Luke's Hosp. v. Schmaltz, 188
Colo. 353, 534 P.2d 781 (1975) (no sale under warranty theory or strict liability theory as
applied to hospital where provision of blood was a service).
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tained; and that the consumer of such products is entitled to the maxi-
mum of protection at the hands of someone, and that the proper
persons to afford it are those who market the products.
0 6
The emphasis is thus upon "marketing" in the sense of promotion, upon
the treatment of the externality as a "cost of production," and upon the
availability of indemnity (insurance) against loss. This latter concept pre-
supposes a relatively large number of similar claims. These criteria fit the
health service provider's incidental use of products only with difficulty.
The first characteristic stated by the comment implies that the burden of
risk-spreading should be placed upon the enterprise producing the prod-
uct, the manufacturer, or upon the entity marketing the product, the dis-
tributor. Many courts have decided that a medical professional can not be
regarded as having marketed an incidentally used product in the sense of
promoting it. 107 For example, in applying the essence test to hold a dentist
not liable as a matter of law for use of a needle with latent defects, one
court stated: 108 "It is further very clear that strict liability was imposed in
our New Jersey cases for the essentially basic reason that those so held
liable put the product 'in the stream of trade and promote its purchase by
the public.' "109 A medical professional does not advertise, merchandise,
or make medical products available for discrete sales to the public. In-
deed, the interpretation that health care providers do not market the prod-
ucts they supply is so widely accepted"o that it has been endorsed by the
very court system I l that produced Truly and Thomas.
Furthermore, this marketing analysis includes an element of identifica-
tion between a product and its promoter. The comment's language that
the seller "stand behind his goods" strongly implies this conclusion."1
2
The distinction between active promotion of a product on the open market
and mere furnishing of the identical product in connection with medical
treatment is evident in the case law. The courts of several jurisdictions
have imposed liability upon blood banks selling contaminated blood
under a warranty theory; but these same courts have held that hospitals
providing such blood as part of a service transaction were not liable under
the same theory.' 3 Such an analysis would result in the conclusion that
Burlington Mills is a manufacturer of fabrics, and Levi Strauss is a sup-
plier of clothes, but St. Joseph Hospital is not a seller of gowns.
106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment c (1965) (emphasis added).
107. See authorities cited supra note 105.
108. Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539 (Hudson County Ct. 1967),
afdsub nom. Magrine v. Spector, 100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (Super Ct. App. Div.
1968), afd, 53 N.J. 259, 250 A.2d 129 (1969).
109. 227 A.2d at 543 (emphasis in original).
110. See supra note 105.
111. Potts v. W.Q. Richards Memorial Hosp., 558 S.W.2d 939, 946 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1977, no writ); Shivers v. Good Shepherd Hosp., Inc., 427 S.W.2d 104, 107 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Tyler 1968, writ refd n.r.e.).
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment c (1965).
113. Compare, e.g., Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Bank v. Hansen, 579 P.2d 1158 (Colo.




The second characteristic of an entity marketing products susceptible to
strict liability is its ability to distribute the risk of losses as part of the cost
of production. Hospitals have been subjected to substantially greater lia-
bility by the erosion of the doctrines of charitable immunity, the "captain
of the ship" rule, the development of liability under administrative and
corporate negligence, and a number of other recently created duties.' "4 If
liability without fault is added in a manner inapplicable to other service
providers, the cumulative weight of risk-distribution could exceed bene-
fits.' I' Furthermore, the risk-distribution feature of the strict liability ra-
tionale assumes that such costs can be distributed over a large market.
Although they are ultimately passed on, the point at which costs are dis-
tributed can make a substantial difference in impact upon the consumer.
For example, a million dollar judgment against a manufacturer that pro-
duces ten million needles a year would increase consumer costs only ten
cents. The same judgment levied against a small rural hospital serving one
thousand patients annually would increase the cost to each patient by one
thousand dollars.' 16 But even that difference is not the end of the point;
the cost of defense is often greater than the award in medical malpractice
cases. Imposition of strict liability on the health service provider would
not only spread those costs over a smaller public, " 7' but would, if all po-
tentially liable defendants were joined, require multiplication of legal costs
without increasing awards." 18 Assuming that the same multiplier will ap-
ply to insurance brokerage, loss management programs, and other expend-
itures that imposition of liability is likely, indeed is intended, to induce, it
114. Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253
(1965) (administrative and corporate negligence); Sparger v. Worley Hosp., Inc., 547 S.W.2d
582 (Tex. 1977) ("captain of the ship" doctrine); Howle v. Camp Amon Carter, 470 S.W.2d
629 (Tex. 1971) (abrogating the doctrine of charitable immunity). Cases illustrating ex-
panded areas of liability also include: Beeck v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., 18 Ariz. App. 165, 500
P.2d 1153 (1972) (vicarious liability for the acts of hospital-based physicians); Purcell v.
Zimbelman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 P.2d 335 (1972) (responsibility for granting staff privi-
leges); Air Shields, Inc. v. Spears, 590 S.W.2d 574 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, writ ref d
n.r.e.) (formulation of hospital policies and procedures).
115. The United States Senate noted its concern over rising hospital costs in hearings
related to health legislation and antitrust. S. REP. No. 1285, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
[1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7842, 7895. The committee stated: "Although recog-
nizing the increase in costs experienced by health care providers attributable to $eneral infla-
tion, the Committee wishes to express its concern with respect to the disproportionately high
rate of increase in costs of health care services." Id.
116. For similar reasons, the health service provider will be inefficient atpurchasing in-
surance. Cf. P. SAMUELSON, supra note 83, at 422.
117. The mere spreading of risks, without lower transaction and insurance costs, is not a
rational objective in economic terms. See R. POSNER, supra note 74, at 93-94 & n.3. But cf.
P. SAMUELSON, supra note 83, at 421-22.
118. Even if the health service provider is indemnified, so that he loses nothing related to
the plaintiff's actual damage recovery, the health service provider has, indeed, lost some-
thing-the cost of defense of the claim against him and of recovering on the indemnity claim
made by him. In many malpractice cases this cost far exceeds the amount paid the plaintiff.
Of course, legal costs are a part of a necessary system of recovery to address safety exter-
nalities. But if benefits (ie., the increase in damages paid plaintiffs) are exceeded by detri-




becomes apparent that the costs of the remedy may exceed its benefits.
These costs represent net losses to the consuming public even if the health
service provider recovers contribution or indemnity. In fact, the prosecu-
tion and defense of such third-party claims will occasion additional dead-
weight losses.
The third feature of the loss-distribution rationale concerns the optimal
party to obtain liability insurance for accidental injuries caused by defec-
tive products. The manufacturer or distributor who handles a specific line
of products can do so efficiently. Insurance policies can be drawn to cover
reasonably anticipated areas of liability for a narrow range of products. A
health care provider, however, is not in a position to obtain insurance as
readily for the wide range of products it uses." 9 An effort to do so would
be particularly inefficient in view of the absence of precedent for products
liability in this context.' 20 Claims history is lacking, future developments
are relatively unpredictable, and uncertainty would increase premiums.
Reasonable reliance on established law would mean that many health
service providers would face novel liability for which they had sensibly not
purchased insurance, since it would have been wasteful to do so. Further-
more, while the requirement of product insurance seems a sensible re-
quirement for the enterprise marketing the good, an entity providing a
service, such as a hospital, already insures itself against defects in service
by obtaining the coverage for professional negligence. 121
Deterrence. One of the recognized purposes of tort law is to deter individ-
uals or entities from injuring people or acting in other ways that are detri-
mental to the interests of society. One of the strongest reasons for
imposing liability, therefore, is to make such individuals conform their
conduct to the standard required by the law. Arguably, this policy sup-
ports the imposition of liability upon manufacturers of defective products,
since they are in a position to control the uniformity and quality of their
products. They are also the only parties likely to be in a position to know
whether a product has qualities that make it so inherently unsafe that it
should not be marketed.
119. Strict liability prohibits the manufacturer from defending by pointing to the cost-
benefit balance, and that prohibition may be economically inefficient. It "prevents the man-
ufacturer [or, in this case, the physician] from shifting the cost of insurance to . . . the
cheaper insurer .... R. POSNER, supra note 72, at 137.
120. "[C]ertain mathematical conditions are necessary before sufficiently exact actuarial
probabilities can be determined." P. SAMUELSON, supra note 83, at 422. These include (1) a
record of a "large number of transactions" to allow pooling of risk and (2) the occurrence of
uncertain events that are "relatively independent." The absence of a record as to actuarial
predictions of product life would require a lengthy period to overcome. Independent events
can not be adequately documented as to newly developed products that might contain com-
mon latent defects causing a large unexpected loss. Insufficient time exists in the early life of
a new product to chart uniform malfunctions, an essential aspect of actuarial probabilities.
The constancy of change in the medical practice thus makes it an inherently poor insured.
121. Cf. Watkins v. United States, 482 F. Supp. 1006, 1012 (M.D. Tenn. 1980) ("physi-




The deterrence rationale, if applied to health care providers, would im-
ply that looking to them for the detection of latent defects in the broad
range of products they use is rational. But the typical hospital, clinic, or
individual physician cannot economically undertake universal product
testing. These entities are consumers of products; they must rely on manu-
facturers and distributors to avoid latent manufacturing, design, or warn-
ing defects just as the individual consumer does. Apart from the instance
in which a reasonably alert doctor or nurse would notice that a vial's con-
tents are not the usual color or consistency (in which event strict liability is
unncessary because a negligence claim would lie), medical professionals
are not themselves qualified and do not employ others to test a drug, nee-
dle, or instrument to ascertain its fitness. The court in Bichler v. Willing' 22
recognized that:
"In today's world, it is often only the manufacturer who can fairly be
said to know and to understand when an article is . . . safely made
for its intended purpose. Once floated on the market, many articles
• . . defy detection of defect. . . . IT]he manufacturer. . . alone . . .
has the practical opportunity . . . to turn out useful . . . but safe
products." 23
Since this ability is lacking in health service providers, the deterrence ra-
tionale loses much of its force.
After one recognizes that medical professionals customarily do not have
the facility for detecting product defects, the question that remains is
whether such a capability should be initiated. Inducing such a profes-
sional to employ the range of technical experts that would be necessary to
evaluate each variety of pill, needle, valve, or bandage he administers
would not be appropriate. The result would be an increase in the cost of
health care disproportionate to any probable improvement.124 The alter-
native reaction for a health care provider would be that of a distributor
who carries a limited range of products-namely, to discontinue providing
sensitive products and require the patient to purchase them from another
source. Such a policy would not serve patients well, and it can hardly be
considered as representing the intent of the courts or legislatures that have
adopted strict liability.' 25
IV. CONCLUSION
With rare unanimity the courts have historically refused to impose strict
liability upon health service providers for miscarriages of products inci-
dentally used by them. This approach has not been peculiar to the medical
122. 58 A.D. 2d 331, 397 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1977).
123. Id. at 59 (emphasis and ellipses in original) (quoting Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d
330, 340-41, 298 N.E.2d 622, 627, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 468 (1973)).
124. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
125. Strict liability "prevents the consumer who is a risk preferrer from trading on his
taste." R. POSNER, supra note 72, at 137. In common-sense terms a patient might desire to
be treated by use of a product entailing significant risk because the alternative is less effec-
tive treatment, but Truly and Thomas may prevent this choice.
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profession; it is a manifestation of the general rule that while product pro-
moters, including manufacturers, wholesalers, or retailers, may be liable
without fault for injuries caused by product defects, service providers who
incidentally use products may not. The courts have fashioned the "essence
of the transaction" test to ensure simple characterization of an entire rela-
tionship as either a sale or a service-but not both. The purpose of this
rule is to avoid inappropriate imposition of strict liability upon service
providers who inevitably use products to some degree.
The promoter of a product sold at a discrete instant may justly be sub-
jected to expectations of uniformity. Arguments for strict liability are
therefore stronger in the context of such a sale. Services, however, require
adaptation to varying circumstances and are rendered over a duration of
time; hence, negligence analysis is more appropriate. The essence test re-
spects this difference by a distinction that is as crisp and clear as can be
expected of the common law. The two cases analyzed here, Thomas and
Truly, signal a significant departure from this approach without appropri-
ate analysis of its history or purpose.
The result in Thomas and Truly is liability at variance with its economic
policy foundations. Warranty theory presupposes consumer expectations
as to quality that are related to price by the law of supply and demand.
This assumption is inapplicable to products incidentally used by physi-
cians, because a consumer market is unlikely, and independent price-qual-
ity negotiations are not customarily conducted between physician and
patient as buyer and seller. Arguably, the policies underlying strict tort
liability do apply to medical accidents. Although these policies may sup-
port imposition of liability on promoters, whether they do so with respect
to health service providers is doubtful. The compensation purpose is not
significantly advanced by adding physician liability to that imposed upon
manufacturers and distributors. Neither does the medical professional
provide a cost-effective point at which to ensure distribution of the risk of
loss. Deterrence of the externality of unsafe product distribution cannot be
significantly enhanced by imposing strict liability on medical profession-
als, since they are consumers of the myriad products they incidentally use
and cannot test each one as a manufacturer would. Thus the two decisions
examined here cannot be justified by reference to either principle or policy.
They should not be followed in the future.
[Vol. 36
